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Abstract: A reductionist proof for sender anonymity of an asymmetric bilinear pair-
ing based mixnet (BILMIX) is presented. We give an experiment-based deﬁnition for
anonymity and show that BILMIX possesses anonymity in the semi-honest model
against static adversaries assuming that the co-Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman Problem, the
Matching Find-Guess Problem and the Matching Diﬃe-Hellman Problem are hard.
A new problem called Divisible Decisional Factorized Diﬃe-Hellman Problem (DDF-
DHP) is introduced and showed that ﬁnding connection between data stored by the
Registration Authority and the receiver is at least as hard as breaking DDF-DHP, with
the assumption that secret keys of the Registration Authority and the special bulletin
board are kept secret.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Mix networks (or in short mixnets) ([Danezis et al. 2009], [Ren and Wu 2010],
[Sampigethaya and Poovendran 2006]) are among the most widely used con-
structions for providing anonymous communication between participants. In
1981, shortly after the public key cryptography was presented, Chaum created a
mail system which included a single computer, called mix. The purpose of a mix
was to hide the correspondences between its input and output ([Chaum 1981]).
In the same paper, a series of mixes (or cascade mix) was also proposed by
increasing the number of mixes. The main idea is that each mix accepts an in-
put batch of encrypted messages and produces an output batch containing the
cryptographically transformed, permuted input batch. The cryptographic trans-
formation is usually a re-encryption or a decryption. In this way the mixnet
achieves untraceability between the input and output batches.
In real world there are many applications where providing unlinkability of the
message and its sender is necessary. For example, we can think of electronic vot-
ing, electronic exam, electronic tender, electronic auction and electronic opinion
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poll systems, or collectively e-assessment systems. Although the users’ identities
could be known in a mass (namely the anonymity set), during the process the
users should not be able to be linked with their messages. Focusing on these
e-assessment systems one can observe that only the users are anonymous, the
authority receiving the messages is publicly known.
After a certain deadline, the authorities evaluate the submissions and an-
nounce the results. Considering an e-exam, an e-tender or an e-auction system,
at some point the users should be informed about their success, hence knowing
their real identity is essential. The other reason to reveal user identity is to avoid
anonymous criminal activities. The situation when a user is not cooperating in
this phase, i.e. does not want to reveal his/her identity (e.g. undesirable grades)
should also be considered. Therefore the possibility of anonymity revocation is
crucial.
Depending on the application a mixnet should be able to eﬃciently handle
short and long messages. In case of e-voting or e-auction schemes the votes or the
bids are usually very short messages, but in case of e-exam or e-tender schemes
the submission could be signiﬁcantly longer. Our aim is to construct a mixnet
which is able to handle messages with arbitrary length eﬃciently.
Furthermore, it could be also a natural demand that the anonymous senders
receive a reply to their messages, at least a receipt about the successful sub-
mission. For example, in case of e-tender schemes the authority can warn the
anonymous senders about a missing document. Similarly, in case of e-exams or
e-poll systems having a possibility of a reply enables to proceed more than one
round (e.g. the second questionnaire is chosen depending on the answers of the
ﬁrst one).
Another requirement for the senders is to be eligible which means that the
user has to fulﬁll all the prerequisites for the participation in an e-assessment
system. Only eligible users’ messages are considered and evaluated and the sys-
tem has to detect the users that are not eligible and reject their submissions.
Since the users are anonymous, to determine their eligibility is cumbersome.
The identiﬁcation and the submission process should be separated, therefore the
authorities of these processes as well.
The proposed mixnet is a general solution, which accomplishes all the re-
quirements mentioned above: provides the anonymity for the users, the eligibil-
ity veriﬁcation, the possibility of anonymous reply and anonymity revocation,
and eﬃciently handles arbitrarily long messages. Moreover, considering an e-
assessment system the submissions should be secret and undeniable.
1.2 Related work
Mix networks are the basis for many applications, especially in the ﬁeld of elec-
tronic voting ([Jakobsson et al. 2002]), anonymous email ([Danezis et al. 2003])
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and location privacy ([Golle et al. 2004, Huang et al. 2006]).
The onion routers (or in short ORs) were developed based on mixnets to
provide low-latency in private communication applications such as web search
or instant messaging. However, the onion routing systems have limitations
in case of anonymity and they are vulnerable to some attacks: traﬃc anal-
ysis attacks ([Raymond 2001], [Erdin et al. 2015]) as well as intersection at-
tacks ([Danezis and Serjantov 2004], [Wright et al. 2003]). A signiﬁcant num-
ber of ORs were proposed and applied ([Backes et al. 2012], [Kate et al 2007],
[Chen et al. 2015]). The largest and widely used OR system is Tor, which has
more than 2 million users and thousands of onion routers ([Tor project 2003]).
In 2017, a new variant of ﬁxed-cascade mixing networks, the cMix protocol was
proposed by Chaum and others ([Chaum et al. 2017]). It has a precomputation
phase to avoid computationally intensive public-key cryptographic operations
in its core real-time protocol. Therefore, it is low-latency and its ﬁxed cascade
structure of mixnodes yields strong anonymity. The phases of cMix are similar
to the ones of onion routing, however cMix resists the typical attacks of ORs.
cMix is the ﬁrst mixing suitable for low latency chat for lightweight devices.
Hybrid mix networks, introduced by Pﬁtzmann
([Pﬁtzmann and Waidner 1985]), eﬃciently handle messages with arbitrary
length by combining symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic primitives. A
recent system called Riﬄe ([Kwon et al. 2016]) is a bandwidth and compu-
tation eﬃcient communication system with strong anonymity and provides
both sender and receiver anonymity by using veriﬁable shuﬄes and private
information retrieval. The hybrid shuﬄe applying asymmetric encryptions
is performed only once to share symmetric authenticated encryption keys.
The hybrid mix designed by Ohkubo and Abe ([Ohkubo and Abe 2000]) uses
symmetric encryption keys derived by applying a hash function to the results of
a Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange. Our construction also applies a Diﬃe-Hellman
key exchange and an asymmetric bilinear pairing for a secure symmetric key
exchange.
Determining the real identity of an anonymous user by a Trusted Entity is the
most commoly used technique with the directive that it uses this ability only if it
is necessary and/or it has the right to do so ([Camenisch and Lysyanskaya 2001],
[Chen et al. 2011], [Preneel et al. 2003], [Federrath et al. 2006]). It is often com-
bined with blind or fair blind signatures. In [Preneel et al. 2003] Preneel and his
co-workers gave Crowd-like and OR-like solutions of anonymity revocation in
case of anonymous internet access. They introduced a management entity and
a trustee to their proposals as well, where the trustee participates only if the
revocation is needed, it does not take part in the anonymization process.
There are mixnet solutions that provide anonymous reply. In [Chaum 1981]
Chaum proposed untraceable return addresses which allow the receiver to send a
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reply message without knowing senders identity. Another example is the Mixmin-
ion ([Danezis et al. 2003]), which is an anonymous remailer protocol and it sup-
ports Single-Use Reply Blocks (or SURBs) to allow anonymous recipients. In
these schemes the sender recursively encrypts the return address block and sends
it in the body of the message. These encryptions are necessary, even if the re-
ceiver does not intend to reply. In our construction cryptographic operations are
needed only if the receiver sends messages back.
Our proposed protocol is based on bilinear pairings ([Menezes 1993]). As a
consequence of the Boneh and Franklin’s ID-based cryptosystem based on bilin-
ear pairings ([Boneh and Franklin 2001]) many new cryptographic constructions
appeared. In 2009, Zhong proposed an identity-based, re-encryption mix network
([Zhong 2009]) based on symmetric bilinear maps. Zhong’s scheme applies only
asymmetric encryptions, hence it can be used for sending short messages, only.
At a ﬁxed security level, group elements in the asymmetric setting are smaller
and pairings can be computed more eﬃciently. As far as we know, our construc-
tion is the ﬁrst hybrid mixnet, which is based on asymmetric bilinear maps.
1.3 Our results
The most important requirement for the mix networks is the anonymity property,
i.e. possessing all the messages sent to determine the identity of a sender should
be a hard problem. However, the possibility of anonymity revocation, anony-
mous reply, eligibility veriﬁcation is also expected in practice, see the examples
above. Most of the cases the system should also eﬃciently handle arbitrarily long
messages, therefore, our main objective is to construct a complex mixnet which
possesses all the previous requirements.
We presented our symmetric bilinear pairing based hybrid mixnet with
anonymity revocation in 2015 ([Huszti and Kovacs 2015]). We designed a hybrid
mix to handle short and long messages. In [Huszti and Kovacs 2015] besides
describing the protocol we examined the time and space complexity compared
to Zhong’s proposal ([Zhong 2009]) as well. Besides the complexity calculations
we also proved that our solution was correct. More details can be found in our
previous paper [Huszti and Kovacs 2015].
Here, we improve our scheme ([Huszti and Kovacs 2015]) by applying asym-
metric bilinear maps and prove sender anonymity in the semi honest model
against a static adversary. In this model the corrupted parties do not deviate
from the protocol speciﬁcation, but they collaborate with the adversary to gather
information and secrets. We assume that at least one mix server and two users
are trustworthy, so they are not corrupted by the adversary, i.e. they do not
reveal their secrets (the secret keys and secret permutations). We also assume
the existence of a special bulletin board operating honestly, possessing a key
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pair. Furthermore, the secret keys of the Registration Authority and the bul-
letin board are kept secret, e.g. they are secretly shared in a threshold manner.
We give the deﬁnition of anonymity with the help of an experiment and ap-
ply a reductionist proof. We call our asymmetric bilinear pairing based mixnet
protocol BILMIX.
We show that if an adversary is able to break sender anonymity, then there
exists a polynomial time algorithm that solves the co-Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman
Problem (co-BDHP), or else it solves either the Matching Find-Guess Problem
(MFGP) or the Matching Diﬃe-Hellman Problem (MDHP). We also deﬁne vari-
ations of a new problem called Divisible Decisional Factorized Diﬃe-Hellman
Problem (DDF-DHP) and show that ﬁnding connection between data stored
by the Registration Authority and the receiver is at least as hard as breaking
DDF-DHP.
1.4 Outline of the paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the nec-
essary deﬁnitions and problems. Section 3 describes our proposed protocol. The
security analysis with a focus on proving anonymity property is presented in
section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes with a summary.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we overview the basic deﬁnitions and the hard problems we apply
for the construction of BILMIX. Our protocol is based on asymmetric bilinear
maps, we apply a blind signature scheme for hiding the link between senders
and their messages. The security of the protocol is based on the variations of the
Diﬃe-Hellman problem.
Beginning with the work of Joux ([Joux 2004]) in 2000, bilinear
pairings have been extensively used to design cryptographic protocols
([Boneh and Franklin 2001], [Boneh et al. 2002], [Boldyreva 2003]). We diﬀeren-
tiate symmetric and asymmetric bilinear maps. First we give the deﬁnition of
the asymmetric bilinear map.
Deﬁnition 1 Asymmetric bilinear map. Let G1, G2 and GT be three
groups of order q for some large prime q. A map e : G1 × G2 → GT is an
asymmetric bilinear map if satisﬁes the following properties:
1. Bilinear : We say that a map e : G1 × G2 → GT is bilinear if e(aP1, bP2) =
e(P1, P2)
ab for all (P1, P2) ∈ G1 ×G2 and all a, b ∈ Z
∗
q .
2. Non-degenerate: The map does not send all pairs in G1 ×G2 to the identity
in GT . ∀P1 ∈ G1, e(P1, P2) = 1 ∀P2 ∈ G2 iﬀ P1 = 1G1 .
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3. Computable: There is an eﬃcient algorithm to compute e(P1, P2) for any
(P1, P2) ∈ G1 ×G2.
Asymmetric pairings for which an eﬃciently-computable isomorphism ψ :
G2 → G1 is known are called Type 2 pairings ([Galbraith et al. 2008]),
while asymmetric pairings for which no eﬃciently computable isomorphism is
known either from G1 to G2 or from G2 to G1 are called Type 3 pairings
([Galbraith et al. 2008]). Many cryptographic protocols in the asymmetric set-
ting rely on the existence of ψ for their security reduction while some use it in
the protocol itself. Known examples of such pairings are the Weil and Tate pair-
ings over suitable elliptic curve groups G1 and G2. If G1 = G2 then the pairing
is symmetric and it is called a Type 1 pairing. Since Type 1 pairings are quite
restricted in terms of the choice of curves and are signiﬁcantly slower than their
asymmetric counterparts at higher security levels ([Hankerson et al. 2008]), we
apply pairings Type 3. Typically, G1, G2 are elliptic curve groups and GT is a
multiplicative group of a ﬁnite ﬁeld.
From now on let G1, G2 be elliptic curve groups with generator elements
P1 and P2, respectively. Usually the security of cryptographic protocols apply-
ing bilinear maps is based on the variants of the Diﬃe-Hellman Problem. In
[Smart and Vercauteren 2005], the following computational and decisional prob-
lems are deﬁned.
We deﬁne a pairing problem instance to be a tuple Γ =
(q,G1, G2, GT , P1, P2, e). First we deﬁne various notions of the Compu-
tational Diﬃe-Hellman (CDH) and the Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman (DDH)
problems.
Deﬁnition 2 The CDHi,j,k Problem. Given a pairing problem instance Γ =
(q,G1, G2, GT , P1, P2, e) and values i, j, k ∈ {1, 2} we deﬁne the CDHi,j,k Prob-
lem to be the following: Given aPi and bPj , with a, b ∈ Z
∗
q , we are asked to
compute abPk.
Deﬁnition 3 The DDHi,j,k Problem. Given a pairing problem instance Γ =
(q,G1, G2, GT , P1, P2, e) and values i, j, k ∈ {1, 2} we deﬁne the DDHi,j,k Prob-
lem to be the following: Given aPi, bPj and cPk, with a, b, c ∈ Z
∗
q , we are asked
to decide whether cPk = abPk.
When G1 = G2, these problems reduce to the standard CDH and DDH
problems. In some publications ([Boneh et al. 2002],[Chatterjee et al. 2010]) the
cases of i = k = 1, j = 2 are deﬁned as co-CDH and co-DDH problems.
Similarly to what happens in symmetric pairing groups, the DDHi,j,k with
i = j problem is easy in asymmetric bilinear map groups. According to the
terminology, those groups are called Gap Diﬃe-Hellman groups, where CDHP
is hard, but DDHP is easy.
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We can also formalize a number of variations of the Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman
(BDH) problem.
Deﬁnition 4 The BDHi,j,k Problem. Given a pairing problem instance Γ =
(q,G1, G2, GT , P1, P2, e) and values i, j, k ∈ {1, 2} we deﬁne the BDHi,j,k prob-
lem to be the following: Given aPi, bPj and cPk, with a, b, c ∈ Z
∗
q , we are asked
to compute e(P1, P2)
abc.
Variations of the co-Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman (co-BDH) Problem are formal-
ized as follows.
Deﬁnition 5 The co−BDHj,k Problem. Given a pairing problem instance
Γ = (q,G1, G2, GT , P1, P2, e) and values j, k ∈ {1, 2} we deﬁne the co−BDHj,k
Problem to be the following: Given aP1, aP2, bPj and cPk, with a, b, c ∈ Z
∗
q , we
are asked to compute e(P1, P2)
abc.
We apply blind short signatures to provide a valid signature on the sub-
mission in a way that the signer (Registration Authority) does not learn any
information about the message. Boldyreva in [Boldyreva 2003] provided a blind
signature scheme based on any Gap Diﬃe-Hellman (GDH) group.
We apply a blind GDH signature scheme based on the variant of
the BLS signature ([Boneh et al. 2002]), the BLS-3b signature given in
[Chatterjee et al. 2010], which uses Type 3 pairings.
Deﬁnition 6 Blind BLS-3b signature scheme. The public parameters are:
Gap co-Diﬃe-Hellman groups (G1, G2) with prime order q, generator elements
P1 ∈ G1 and P2 ∈ G2 and a Map-to-point hash function H : {0, 1}
∗ → G1. The
Blind BLS-3b signature description is the following:
– Keygen: The secret key is a random value x ∈ Z∗q and the public key is
(Ppub1 , Ppub2) = (xP1, xP2) ∈ G1 ×G2 for a signer.
– Blind Signature Issuing Protocol : Given secret key x and a message
m ∈ {0, 1}∗.
• (Blinding) The user chooses randomly r ∈ Z∗q , computes
M ′ = rP1 +H(m) and sends M
′ to the signer.
• (Signing) The signer computes σ′ = xM ′ and sends back σ′ to the user.
• (Unblinding) The user then computes the signature σ = σ′− rPpub1 and
outputs (m,σ).
– Verify : Given public key (Ppub1 , Ppub2), a message m and a signature σ,
verify e(H(m), Ppub2) = e(σ, P2).
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The security of the BLS-3b signature scheme is based on the vari-
ant of the Computational co-Diﬃe-Hellman Problem that is given in
[Chatterjee et al. 2010].
Deﬁnition 7 The co-CDH* Problem. Given a pairing problem instance
Γ = (q,G1, G2, GT , P1, P2, e) we deﬁne the co − CDH
∗ Problem to be the fol-
lowing: Given aP1, aP2 and bP1, with a, b ∈ Z
∗
q , we are asked to compute abP1.
The intractability of discrete logarithm problem in G1 and G2 are both nec-
essary for the hardness of co-CDHP*. If co-CDHP* in (G1, G2) is hard, and H
is a random function, then the BLS-3b signature scheme is secure.
3 The BILMIX
In this section we detail the steps of BILMIX. Our proposed protocol can be built
on any G1, G2, GT groups, where (G1, G2) are Gap Diﬃe-Hellman groups and
GT is a multiplicative group. There are several senders (S1, . . . , Sn), mix servers
(M1, . . . ,MN = R), where the last mix server is the receiver, furthermore there
is a Registration Authority (RA) participating in our protocol. We use a publicly
readable special bulletin board (ββ) for showing the veriﬁcation values.
There are seven phases in BILMIX. Phases 1-5 are required, and phases 6-7
are optional. We describe them brieﬂy at ﬁrst.
Preparation: In this phase all the parameters and keys are generated, public
ones are made public. A key pair is generated for ββ. The Registration Authority
generates the system parameters and a key pair, the mix servers also compute
their secret, public keys. The mixnet, i.e. all mix servers together generate the
mixnet public keys, too.
Registration: The sender indicates his intention of sending a message to
the receiver and gets the permission from the Registration Authority for it. If
the sender is eligible then the Registration Authority gives a signature on the
sender’s blinded message.
Submission: The senders compose and send their messages to the ﬁrst mix
server. Messages equipped with the signature of the Registration Authority are
encrypted with symmetric keys calculated by the senders. Besides the ciphertext
a parameter, which is essential for the mix servers to calculate the symmetric
keys applied for the decryption, is also transmitted.
Mixing: The ﬁrst mix server gets the messages from the senders, decrypts
and transmits the permutated list of the messages to the next mix server. The
messages are being transmitted through the mix network - each server decrypts
and permutes the messages - until they arrive to the last mix server, the receiver.
Receiving: The last mix server, the receiver, calculates the symmetric keys
and decrypts the messages. The receiver also veriﬁes the eligibility of the sender
via the signature of RA.
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There are two optional phases. In some systems it is necessary to send a reply
to the anonymous sender without revealing his identity and/or to reveal the real
identity of the senders.
Anonymous Reply: In this optional phase the receiver can send a message
to the anonymous sender by using a value which is calculated and placed into
the encrypted message by the sender in the submission phase.
Anonymity Revocation: In this optional phase the sender’s ID is revealed.
There are two ways for this: with the sender’s help or with the joint support of
all mix servers.
3.1 Preparation
During preparation the system parameters, public and secret keys are generated
involving the Registration Authority and the mix servers.
RA generates the system parameters, such as: groups G1, G2, GT , generator
elements P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2, a bilinear map e : G1 × G2 → GT , hash functions
H1 : {0, 1}
∗ → G1 and H2 : GT → {0, 1}
l. A key pair is generated for ββ,
r ∈ Z∗q and rQ denote the secret and public key, respectively. For signing RA
chooses a random secret value s ∈ Z∗q and outputs public key (sP, sQ). The
secret keys r, s can be shared in a threshold manner. Public key parameter rsP
is also calculated with the help of ββ.
M1 Mj MN
SKM1 = (m1, x1) SKMj = (mj , xj) SKR = (mN , xN )
m1Q
−−−−−−→ . . .
(
∏j−1
k=1
mk)Q
−−−−−−−−−→
(
∏j
k=1
mk)Q
−−−−−−−−−→ . . .
mQ = (
∏N
k=1 mk)Q
x1m1Q
−−−−−−→ . . .
(
∏j−1
k=1
xkmk)Q
−−−−−−−−−−−→
(
∏j
k=1
xkmk)Q
−−−−−−−−−−−→ . . .
xmQ = (
∏N
k=1 xkmk)Q
xNQ
PKM1 = x1m1Q PKMj = xj(
∏j
k=1 mk)Q PKR = xNmQ
Table 1: Calculating the server key pairs and the public keys of the mixnet.
Table 1 shows the key generation process of the mix servers. Each mix server Mj
generates a key pair (SKMj , PKMj ), where j = 1, . . . , N , and the mixnet public
keys mQ,xmQ ∈ G2. Let SKMj = (mj , xj), where mj , xj ∈ Z
∗
q are random and
secret. For calculating the public keys each mix server outputs (
∏j
k=1mk)Q and
(
∏j
k=1 xkmk)Q to the next server and Mj calculates PKMj = xj(
∏j
k=1mk)Q.
Lastly, R computes mQ and xmQ, where m,x ∈ Z∗q . The value mQ is used
for calculating commitment values μi, and xmQ is necessary for the encrypted
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identities i, where x is never calculated explicitly. R also outputs xNQ public
key for providing anonymous reply.
3.2 Registration
The senders and RA participate in this phase, RA veriﬁes senders el-
igibility and blindly authorizes their messages. Blind BLS-3b signatures
([Chatterjee et al. 2010]) are applied for hiding the messages, hence the Reg-
istration Authority is not able link a message with its sender. This means, that
even RA cannot relate IDs to the messages.
Si RA ββ
Si, msg, u
(i) SK = s
H1(msg) + u
(i)P PK = (sP, sQ, rsP )
Si,H1(msg)+u
(i)P
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
s(H1(msg) + u
(i)P )
s(H1(msg)+u
(i)P )
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Si,e(s(H1(msg)+u
(i)P ),mQ)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
e(s(H1(msg)+u
(i)P ),xmQ)
u(i)sP , sH1(msg), msg μi = e(s(H1(msg) + u
(i)P ),mQ)r
e(sH1(msg), Q)
?
= e(H1(msg), sQ) i = Si ⊕H2(e(s(H1(msg) + u
(i)P ), xmQ)r)
Table 2: Signature generation.
Table 2 shows all the calculations performed for generating the signature on
the message being submitted. Firstly, sender Si creates the message msg that
he would like to send to the receiver R. After calculating the blinded message
H1(msg) + u
(i)P , where the blinding factor u(i) ∈ Z∗q is chosen randomly, Si
sends his ID (Si) and the blinded message on a secret, authenticated channel to
RA. Knowing the ID, RA checks the database containing eligible users’ data
whether Si is eligible. If Si is in the database, RA blindly signs the message and
sends s(H1(msg) + u
(i)P ) back. Moreover, RA calculates and transfers values
e(s(H1(msg) + u
(i)P ),mQ), e(s(H1(msg) + u
(i)P ), xmQ) and Si to ββ on an
authenticated channel, a commitment value μi = e(s(H1(msg)+u
(i)P,mQ)r for
veriﬁcation purposes and a value εi = Si ⊕H2(e(s(H1(msg) + u
(i)P ), xmQ)r),
which is the sender’s encrypted ID is calculated by ββ. ββ publishes all pairs
(μi, εi) in a permuted order.
After receiving the signed blinded message, Si is able to obtain a valid signa-
ture onmsg i.e. calculating sH1(msg) with the knowledge of u
(i)sP . Si is able to
verify the signature by checking the equality e(sH1(msg), Q) = e(H1(msg), sQ).
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3.3 Message submission and mixing
This phase consists of two parts: submission and mixing. During submission
senders calculate the symmetric keys and encrypt their messages. After collecting
all submissions the ﬁrst mix server starts the mixing part. Each mix server
decrypts and permutes the messages and transmits them to the next server, the
last mix server is the receiver.
During submission each sender composes his plaintext p =
msg||sH1(msg)||asirQ, which consists of the signed message and a pa-
rameter asirQ, where asi is a secret, random value. The parameter asirQ
is optional, it is necessary only for the anonymous reply. Si chooses u
(i)
randomly and generates N symmetric keys: K
(i)
j = H2(e(rsP, PKMj )
u(i))
(j = 1, . . . , N). Si uses all keys to encrypt the plaintext. The receiver key
KR(= KN ) is applied ﬁrst, and the key of the ﬁrst mix server at last, and
M
(i)
1 = EncK(i)1
(Enc
K
(i)
2
(. . . Enc
K
(i)
R
(p))) is obtained. Finally, Si transfers the
pair (V
(i)
1 ,M
(i)
1 ) to the ﬁrst mix, where V
(i)
1 = u
(i)rQ. The mix servers are able
to compute the same symmetric keys with the help of V
(i)
1 .
Only the ﬁrst mix server collects the pairs from the senders, the other mix
servers obtain their input from the previous servers. Table 3 shows the calcula-
tions made by a mix server (denoted by Mj , where j = 2, ..., N − 1). The ﬁrst
mix server proceeds the same calculations, the only diﬀerence is that the input
comes from the senders. The computations of the last mix server - the receiver
- are a little bit diﬀerent.
Mj−1 Mj Mj+1
SKMj = (mj , xj)
PKMj = xj(
∏j
k=1 mk)Q
V
(i)
j
||M
(i)
j
−−−−−−−−→
V
(i)
j+1 = mj · V
(i)
j
K
(i)
j
= H2(e(sP, V
(i)
j+1)
xj )
M
(i)
j+1 = DecK(i)
j
(M
(i)
j
)
V
(i)
j+1
||M
(i)
j+1
−−−−−−−−−→
Table 3: Calculations of a mix server.
Table 3 summarizes the input, the calculations and the output of a mix
server for a message sent by the sender Si. The mix server Mj receives n
pairs (V
(i)
j ||M
(i)
j ), where i = 1, . . . , n. Each pair originates from a sender.
The mix server uses the ﬁrst value for calculating the symmetric key that is
necessary to decrypt the second value. For each sender, Mj calculates a ran-
domized symmetric key K
(i)
j from values V
(i)
j+1, sP with the secret key xj .
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With this key Mj removes one ”encryption layer” from the ciphertexts, hence
M
(i)
j+1 = EncK(i)
j+1
(Enc
K
(i)
j+2
(. . . Enc
K
(i)
R
(p))). Mj applies a random permutation
and sends the permuted list of new pairs to the next mix. The factor mj assures
the unlinkability between V
(i)
j and V
(i+1)
j .
3.4 Receiving the message
The last mix server, the receiver R, obtains the pairs from MN−1. After calcu-
lating the symmetric key, R decrypts the message, veriﬁes the eligibility of the
anonymous sender, stores the signed message and the parameter that is used to
reply anonymously.
R calculates the key K
(i)
R = H2(e(sP,mNV
(i)
N )
xN ) from the input values and
decrypts M
(i)
N . After receiving p = msg||sH1(msg)||asirQ, R checks, whether
the message p came from an eligible sender by verifying the signature of RA. R
sends sH1(msg) to ββ that publishes (sH1(msg), rsH1(msg)). R also computes
the commitment value μi = e(sP,mNV
(i)
N ) · e(rsH1(msg),mQ) and veriﬁes its
existence on ββ. If μi is in the database, then RA has received H1(msg)+u
(i)P
during registration, where u(i) is the secret value known only by Si. Being μi and
i on ββ means, that after the deadline, the sender’s identity can be revealed
by the mix servers, including R. The receiver stores: μi||msg||sH1(msg)||asirQ
for eligible senders. The value μi is necessary for anonymity revocation and the
value asirQ is for the reply to the anonymous sender.
3.5 Anonymous reply
In this phase the roles (sender and receiver) are reversed, the receiver R would
like to send a message back to the anonymous senders.
The receiver calculates the symmetric key K̂
(i)
R = H2(e(sP, asirQ)
xN ) to
encrypt the message t(i). K̂
(i)
R is computed from the public key of RA, the secret
key of the receiver and the user’s value asirQ stored by the receiver. R creates
the values V̂
(i)
1 = asirQ and
̂
M
(i)
1 = Enc
K̂
(i)
R
(t(i)) and sends them to the ﬁrst
mix server. There is a pair for each sender.
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Mj−1 Mj Mj+1
SKMj = (mj , xj)
PKMj = xj(
∏j
k=1 mk)P
̂
V
(i)
j
||
̂
M
(i)
j
−−−−−−−−→
̂
V
(i)
j+1 = mj · V̂
(i)
j
K̂
(i)
j
= H2(e(sP,
̂
V
(i)
j+1)
xj )
̂Mj+1
(i)
= Enc ̂
K
(i)
j
(
̂
M
(i)
j
)
̂
V
(i)
j+1
||
̂
M
(i)
j+1
−−−−−−−−−→
Table 4: Calculations of a mix server for the reply messages.
Mix servers perform similar calculations to the mixing phase. The ﬁrst ele-
ment is multiplied by mj , the second value is encrypted. Server Mj sends the
new pairs to the next mix server in permuted order. Server MN−1 outputs all
the calculated pairs with index H1(
̂
K
(i)
N−1) on ββ.
To obtain the reply plaintext t(i), Si calculates the symmetric keys (K̂
(i)
j =
H2(e(rsP, PKMj )
asi ) (j = 1, . . . , N−1), K̂
(i)
R = H2(e(srP, xNQ)
asi )) and looks
for the value H1(
̂
K
(i)
N−1) on ββ. If the sender ﬁnds the hash value, accesses all
the corresponding data and decrypts the encrypted message,
t(i) = Dec
K̂
(i)
R
(Dec
K̂
(i)
1
(. . . Dec
̂
K
(i)
N−1
(
̂
M
(i)
N ))).
3.6 Anonymity revocation
In this optional phase the identity of a sender is determined after a deadline.
In general, anonymity revocation should be provided even if the sender is not
willing to cooperate with the authority (e.g. an examinee does not want to obtain
a bad grade).
For the case when the sender is not cooperative, the mixnet determines the
identity of the sender. The real identity of a sender can be retrieved only, if
either the sender reveals it himself or all the mix servers together calculate it,
as follows. The receiver possessing μi calculates μ
xN
i , where xN is the secret
key parameter, and transmits it to the ﬁrst mix server. Server Mj powers the
received value to the secret key parameter xj and sends it to the next server.
Finally, μxi = [e(sP, u
(i)mrQ) · e(rsH1(msg),mQ)]
x is computed. By calculating
the hash value H2(μ
x
i ), which equals to H2(e(s(H1(msg) + u
(i)P ), rmQ)x), the
identity number Si is revealed via Si = H2(μ
x
i )⊕ εi, where εi is available on ββ.
We should mention if the sender is cooperative, the real identity can be
revealed without the mix servers in an easier and lower-cost way. The sender
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provides the secret value u(i) and R can determine the identity of the sender by
calculating H2(e(rsH1(msg), xmQ) · e(u
(i)rsP, xmQ))⊕ εi.
From the calculations above one can see the adaption of the property of
bilinearity. The mixnet obtains the necessary hash value for anonymity revo-
cation by calculating H2(e(s(H1(msg) + u
(i)P ), rmQ)x), ββ needs to compute
H2(e(s(H1(msg)+u
(i)P ), xmQ)r) and the sender is able to verify the correctness
of εi on ββ by computing i = Si ⊕H2(e(rsH1(msg), xmQ) · e(rsP, xmQ)
u(i)).
4 Security of BILMIX
4.1 Correctness
First we prove that our scheme is correct concerning the mix process, the anony-
mous reply and also the process of anonymity revocation.
Deﬁnition 8 Correctness. We call our mixnet correct, if for every plaintext
calculated by the receiver there is a corresponding ciphertext in the input list of
the mixnet. This means that every plaintext is a multiple decryption of a cipher-
text, and no two plaintexts are the multiple decryptions of the same ciphertext.
The following theorem states that our mixnet is correct.
Theorem9. The proposed mix protocol is operating correctly.
Proof. Each sender Si sends a pair (V
(i)
1 = u
(i)rQ,M
(i)
1 ) to the ﬁrst
mix server M1, where M
(i)
1 is an N-times encryption of the plaintext
p containing the message msg of Si. M1 receives n pairs from the
senders. Mj (where j = 2, . . . , N − 1) receives a permutation of mod-
iﬁed pairs from Mj−1. Senders calculate the symmetric keys for all mix
servers: K
(i)
j = H2(e(rsP, PKMj )
u(i)) = H2(e(rsP, xj(
∏j
k=1mk)Q)
u(i)),
where j = 1, . . . , N − 1. Mix server MJ , J = 1, . . . , N − 1 calcu-
lates symmetric key K
(i)
J = H2(e(sP, V
(i)
J+1)
xJ ) = H2(e(sP,mJV
(i)
J )
xJ ) =
H2(e(sP,mJ(
∏J−1
k=1 mk)u
(i)rQ)xJ ) = H2(e(sP, (
∏J
k=1mk)u
(i)rQ)xJ ). Because
of the bilinear property of pairing e the corresponding keys are the same iﬀ
j = J .
R receives a set of the pairs (V
σ(i)
N ,M
σ(i)
N ) from MN−1, where σ(i) is
the permutation of i = 1, . . . , n. In order to get the plaintexts the re-
ceiver does the following calculations for all M
(j)
N : p
′
j = DecK(j)
R
(M
(j)
N ) =
Dec
K
(j)
R
(Enc
K
(i)
R
(pi)), j = 1, . . . , n, i = σ(j) and K
(j)
R = H2(e(sP,mNV
(j)
N )
xN =
H2(e(sP,mN (
∏N−1
k=1 mk)u
(j)rQ)xN ) = H2(e(sP,mu
(j)rQ)xN ). The symmet-
ric key for R calculated by the sender Si is the following: K
(i)
R =
H2(e(rsP, PKR)
u(i)) = H2(e(rsP, xNmQ)
u(i)). Using the bilinear property of
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pairing e the receiver is able to get a plaintext if and only if K
(j)
R = K
(i)
R ,
thus the plaintext p′j is pi. R calculates μi and checks whether it is on
ββ: μi = e(sP,mNV
(i)
N ) · e(rsH1(msg),mQ) = e(sP,mN (
∏N−1
k=1 mk)u
(i)rQ) ·
e(rsH1(msg),mQ) = e(sP,mu
(i)rQ) · e(rsH1(msg),mQ) = e(su
(i)P, rmQ) ·
e(sH1(msg), rmQ) = e(s(u
(i) +H1(msg)P ), rmQ).
The anonymous reply works similarly to the message submission. In this
case the sender is R and the anonymous receiver is the sender Si who sent
the message msg stored. Si calculates the value index = H1(
̂
K
(i)
N−1) =
H1(H2(e(rsP, PKMN−1)
asi )) = H1(H2(e(rsP, xN−1(
∏N−1
k=1 mk)Q)
asi ))
and looks for it on ββ. Since mix server MN−1 printed the pair
(V̂
(i)
N ,
̂
M
(i)
N ) with the index H1(
̂
K
(i)
N−1) = H1(H2(e(sP, V̂
(i)
N )
xN−1)) =
H1(H2(e(sP,mN−1
̂
V
(i)
N−1)
xN−1))) = H1(H2(e(sP, (
∏N−1
k=1 mk)asirQ)
xN−1)),
Si ﬁnds index and two other values: V̂
(i)
N = (
∏N−1
k=1 mk)asirQ and
̂
M
(i)
N = Enĉ
K
(i)
N−1
(. . . (Enc
K̂
(i)
1
(Enc
K̂
(i)
R
(t)))), where K̂
(i)
j = H2(e(sP,
̂
V
(i)
j+1)
xj ) =
H2(e(sP, (
∏j
k=1mk)asirQ)
xj ) calculated by Mj . Due to the bilin-
ear property of e these keys are the same as Si calculates for Mj :
H2(e(rsP, PKMj )
asi ) = H2(e(rsP, xj(
∏j
k=1mk)Q)
asi ).
Furthermore, R calculates symmetric key: K̂R1 = H2(e(sP, asirQ)
xN and
Si calculates symmetric key: K̂R2 = H2(e(rsP, xNQ)
asi ). Pairing e has bilinear
property so K̂R1 = H2(e(sP, asirQ)
xN ) = H2(e(rsP, xNQ)
asi ) = K̂R2 holds.
4.2 Anonymity
4.2.1 Security Model
We consider a static adversary in the semi-honest model. A model is called semi-
honest, if the dishonest users follow the protocol and also keep a record of all
intermediate results. An adversary is static, if corrupted players are speciﬁed at
the beginning of the protocol, they stay corrupted during the whole process and
no new ones stand in with them. The adversary observes all public information
and possesses all attacked players’ secret information (i.e. keys, permutation).
4.2.2 The Experiment of Anonymity
We give the deﬁnition of anonymity with the help of an experiment. The
anonymity property of our system says that an adversary who has access to cor-
rupt players’ secret data and observes all the public information of the protocol
including views of the Registration Authority and mix servers, input ciphertexts
and the shuﬄed list of output messages, cannot link a message with the sender.
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We also assume, that there is at least one mix server and two senders that are not
corrupted by the adversary, i.e. the secret permutation and secret keys are not
revealed to the adversary, furthermore secret keys of the Registration Authority
and ββ are not revealed to the adversary. At the end, the adversary tries to
give an input/output message pair that originates from a non-corrupted sender
according to the knowledge he gained during the registration and the mixing
part. The experiment is run by adversary Aanon and the challenger Sys.
Deﬁnition 10 Anonymity. The experiment is parameterized by security
parameter λ.
1. The challenger Sys generates secret and public keys for input 1λ. Public keys
and public parameters are sent to ββ.
2. Secret keys and secret random permutations πi of the corrupted mix servers
are given to Aanon.
3. Sys runs the mix process with the list of ciphertexts (c1, . . . , cn) that is
published with the output list of plaintexts (pπ(1), . . . , pπ(n)) on ββ, where
corrupted users’ message pairs (pi, ci) and all intermediate results are revealed
to Aanon.
4. The adversary outputs b′ ∈ {0, 1} for (c0, c1, pb, pb) pairs, where b ∈ {0, 1},
where plaintexts, ciphertexts are generated by senders that were never corrupted
and b = 1−b, and assuming that user-speciﬁc commitment values and encrypted
identity values for all users are listed on ββ in a permuted order.
We deﬁne the advantage of the adversary in this experiment by
AdvSys,Aanon(λ) = |Pr[b
′ = b]−
1
2
|.
The mix network process possesses property of anonymity if for any PPT
adversaryAanon the advantage AdvSys,Aanon(λ) is negligible, where probability is
taken over the coin-ﬂips of Aanon, as well as random coins used in the experiment
for key, permutation, plaintexts and identity number generation.
4.2.3 Proving Anonymity
Let us review the Matching Diﬃe-Hellman Problem ([Frankel et al. 1996],
[Ohkubo and Abe 2000]) and the Matching Find-Guess Problem
([Fujisaki and Okamoto 1999]).
Deﬁnition 11 Matching Diﬃe-Hellman Problem (MDHP) in G2. For
every r ∈ Z∗q given Q, rQ ∈ G2 and V0, V1, rVb, rVb¯ ∈ G2, the problem is to
output b ∈ {0, 1}.
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Deﬁnition 12 Matching Find-Guess Problem (MFGP). For ev-
ery plaintexts x0, x1 and for every secret symmetric keys K0,K1 given
(EncK0(x0), EncK1(x1), xb, xb), the problem is to output b ∈ {0, 1}.
Theorem13. If there exists a static adversary in the semi-honest model that
breaks sender anonymity in BILMIX, there exists a polynomial time algorithm Aˆ
that solves the co−BDHP1,2, or else it solves either the MFGP or the MDHP
with probability non-negligibly better than 1/2 in the random oracle model.
Proof. First of all, we prove that if BILMIX does not provide sender anonymity,
i.e. there exists a polynomial time algorithm Aanon, we can construct an eﬃcient
algorithm A that solves the following problems with the help of Aanon.
Deﬁnition 14 BILMIX Problem (BP). For any P, sP ∈ G1 and
Q, rQ, rxQ ∈ G2 there are tuples (V0,M
(0)
ξ ), (V1,M
(1)
ξ ), (rVb,M
(b)
ξ+1),
(rVb¯,M
(b¯)
ξ+1) given, where s, r, x ∈ Z
∗
q , Vi ∈ G2, moreover M
(i)
j are ci-
phertexts for i ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {ξ, ξ + 1}, where M
(b)
ξ+1 = DecK(b)
ξ
(M
(b)
ξ ) and
K
(b)
ξ = H2(e(sP, Vb)
rx). The problem is to output b ∈ {0, 1}.
We construct the eﬃcient algorithm A, as follows. A simulates the operation
of the players of Sys, i.e. mix servers, RA and the corrupt senders. The honest
senders and the honest mix server, denoted by (S0, S1),Mξ, respectively, are
chosen at the beginning. A sets rQ to be the message being sent to the next
mix server by Mξ and rxQ to be the public key of Mξ. Afterwards, A generates
the remaining secret/public keys and input messages. A during the simulation
rejects secret key exposure queries with respect ξth key. A simulates the view
by simulating the keys and the list of ciphertexts in the following way.
A sets sP as a public key for RA and simulates keys of the ascending servers
by randomly choosing mξ+1,mξ+2, . . . ,mN and xξ+1, xξ+2, . . . , xN to be the
secret keys, and generating mξ+1rQ, mξ+1mξ+2rQ,. . . ,(
∏N
k=ξ+1mk)rQ
and xξ+1mξ+1rQ, xξ+2mξ+1mξ+2rQ, . . . , xN (
∏N
k=ξ+1mk)rQ to be
the public keys. For the descending servers A randomly chooses
mξ−1,mξ−2, . . . ,m1 and xξ−1, xξ−2, . . . , x1 as secret keys, and sets Q,m
−1
ξ−1Q,
m−1ξ−1m
−1
ξ−2Q,. . . , (
∏ξ−1
k=2m
−1
k )Q and xξ−1Q, xξ−2m
−1
ξ−1Q, xξ−3m
−1
ξ−1m
−1
ξ−2Q, . . . ,
x1(
∏ξ−1
k=2m
−1
k )Q as public keys. The following public values are also gen-
erated for all servers (starting from the ﬁrst one): x1(
∏ξ−1
k=2m
−1
k )Q,. . . ,
(
∏ξ−2
k=1 xk)m
−1
ξ−1Q, (
∏ξ−1
k=1 xk)Q, (
∏ξ−1
k=1 xk)xrQ, (
∏ξ−1
k=1 xk)xxξ+1rmξ+1Q, . . . ,
(
∏ξ−1
k=1 xk)x(
∏N
k=ξ+1 xkmk)rQ.
A reveals the secret values of corrupt users and all public ones to Aanon, then
randomly chooses permutations for the corrupt servers and also reveals them to
Aanon. For simplicity, we set all corrupt server permutations to the identity.
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The list of messages are simulated as follows. Denote the elements of the list
sent to Mj by V
(i)
j ||M
(i)
j , where i = 1, . . . , n is the index number of a sender
and j = 1, . . . , N the sequential number of a mix server. A simulates the list for
Mξ+1 by inserting (rVb,M
(b)
ξ+1) and (rVb¯,M
(b¯)
ξ+1) into random positions and for
the rest of the list A randomly chooses y
(i)
ξ+1 ∈ Z
∗
q , calculates V
(i)
ξ+1 = y
(i)
ξ+1Q and
randomly chooses M
(i)
ξ+1 from the ciphertext space. Then A simulates the list
for Mξ, he inserts (V0,M
(0)
ξ ) and (V1,M
(1)
ξ ) into the proper positions, for the
rest of the list randomly chooses y
(i)
ξ ∈ Z
∗
q and sets V
(i)
ξ = y
(i)
ξ Q. A computes
M
(i)
ξ = EncK(i)
ξ
(M
(i)
ξ+1), where K
(i)
ξ = H2(e(srP, rxQ)
u(i)), where u(i) = m−11 ·
. . . ·m−1ξ−1y
(i)
ξ t
−1
, where t ∈ Z∗q is randomly chosen.
For descending serversA randomly choosesm
(i)
j for j = ξ−1, . . . , 1, calculates
V
(i)
j = (m
(i)
j )
−1 · V
(i)
j+1, and K
(i)
j = H2(e(sP, V
(i)
j+1)
xj ) and computes M
(i)
j =
Enc
K
(i)
j
(M
(i)
j+1).
For ascending servers A randomly chooses m
(i)
j for j = ξ + 2, . . . , N − 1,
calculates V
(i)
j = m
(i)
j−1 · V
(i)
j−1 and K
(i)
j = H2(e(sP,m
(i)
j V
(i)
j )
xj ) and computes
M
(i)
j = DecK(i)
j
(M
(i)
j−1).
After decryption the last server receives the plaintexts that are revealed to
Aanon. Plaintext pi is a form of msgi||signi||rvi. A outputs μi, εi, where μi =
e(sP,mNV
(i)
N ) · e(tsigni,
∏N
k=ξ+1mkrQ) and chooses εi ∈ {0, 1}
l randomly.
During simulation A calls random oracles for calculating hash values. After
A reveals the list of plaintexts, ciphertexts and all intermediate results, i.e.
properly simulated views and lists, Aanon distinguishes the two messages in
MN ’s list originate from S0 and S1, i.e outputs b. From this result A can derive
the correspondence between the pairs given in BILMIX Problem and output b.
We get the advantage of static adversary as AdvA = AdvAanon .
As a second step we prove the following lemma.
Lemma15. If A breaks BP, there exists a polynomial time algorithm Aˆ that
breaks the co−BDHP1,2, or else it breaks either the MFGP or the MDHP .
For solving the co − BDHP1,2 or else for solving either the MFGP or the
MDHP we create algorithms Aˆco−BDHP1,2 , AˆMFGP , AˆMDHP , respectively. We
construct Aˆ as follows.
1. Aˆ receives a co − BDHP1,2 instance (P, aP, bP) ∈ G
3
1 and (Q, aQ, cQ) ∈
G32 and an MFGP instance (EncK0(x0), EncK1(x1), xb, xb) and an MDHP
instance (Q, rQ, (V0, V1), (rVb, rVb)).
2. Input each instance to the appropriate algorithm, to Aˆco−BDHP1,2 or AˆMFGP
or AˆMDHP .
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3. Output the data received from the algorithms as a solution to the input
instances.
Let list the steps of the algorithms Aˆco−BDHP1,2 , AˆMFGP and AˆMDHP .
Aˆco−BDHP1,2 after receiving its input generates a problem instance for the sub-
routine A. A solves the problem and outputs the necessary data to Aˆco−BDHP1,2 .
Aˆco−BDHP1,2 passes the output to Aˆ. A has access to the random oracle H2.
Denote the maximum number of queries to H2 by qnum, that is polynomial in
the security parameter λ. We assume that there is j ∈ {0, 1}, such that the value
e(sP, Vj)
rx is among the values that A can ask from H2. If A asks the proper
e(sP, Vj)
rx, A solves the co − BDHP1,2. Let Qi denote the value that is asked
from H2. We denote the probability that e(sP, Vj)
rx is element of the list:
Pco−BDHP1,2 := Pr[∃i ∈ {1, . . . , qnum}, ∃j ∈ {0, 1} : Qi = e(sP, Vj)
rx].
Algorithm Aˆco−BDHP1,2 :
1. Receives (P, aP, bP) ∈ G31 and (Q, aQ, cQ) ∈ G
3
2.
2. Sets rQ := Q, rxQ := cQ, Q := r−1Q, where r ∈ Z∗q randomly chosen.
3. Sets P := P, sP := bP.
4. Chooses b0 ∈ {0, 1} randomly.
5. Sets V ′b0 := aQ and randomly chooses V
′
b0
∈ G2.
6. Calculates V0 := r
−1V ′0 and V1 := r
−1V ′1 .
7. Randomly chooses ciphertexts M
(0)
ξ ,M
(1)
ξ from the ciphertext space, keys
K0,K1 from the keyspace and calculates M
(i)
ξ+1 = DecKi(M
(i)
ξ ) for i ∈ {0, 1}.
8. Chooses b ∈ {0, 1} randomly.
9. Chooses i ∈ [1, . . . , qnum] randomly.
10. Sends problem instance {P, sP,Q, rQ, rxQ, (V0,M
(0)
ξ ),(V1,M
(1)
ξ ),
(V ′b ,M
(b)
ξ+1), (V
′
b¯
,M
(b¯)
ξ+1)} to A.
11. A makes a query to H2. If he asks the i-th query, output the value A asked
and stop.
We note that the simulation is perfect only if the proper Qi – that gives the
solution to the problem instance – is asked, otherwise no query is sent to H2.
In case Aˆ receives an MFGP problem instance, it is forwarded to AˆMFGP .
Algorithm AˆMFGP :
1. Receives (M
(0)
ξ := EncK0(x0),M
(1)
ξ := EncK1(x1),M
(b)
ξ+1 := xb,M
(b)
ξ+1 := xb).
2. Randomly chooses P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2 and s, r, x ∈ Z
∗
q calculates sP ,rQ and
rxQ.
3. Randomly chooses V0, V1 ∈ G2 and calculates V
′
0 = rV0, V
′
1 = rV1.
4. Randomly chooses b0 ∈ {0, 1}.
5. Sends problem instance {P, sP,Q, rQ, rxQ, (V0,M
(0)
ξ ),(V1,M
(1)
ξ ),
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(V ′b0 ,M
(b)
ξ+1), (V
′
b¯0
,M
(b¯)
ξ+1)} to A.
6. A makes a query to H2. For all queries randomly chooses a value form the
keyspace.
7. Returns value b that is output by A.
If Aˆ receives a MDHP problem instance, then it is forwarded to AˆMDHP .
Algorithm AˆMDHP :
1. Receives (Q, rQ, (V0, V1), (rVb, rVb)).
2. Randomly chooses P ∈ G1, s, x ∈ Z
∗
q and calculates sP and rxQ.
3. Randomly chooses ciphertexts M
(0)
ξ ,M
(1)
ξ from the ciphertext space, keys
K0,K1 from the keyspace and calculates M
(i)
ξ+1 = DecKi(M
(i)
ξ ) for i ∈ {0, 1}.
4. Randomly chooses b0 ∈ {0, 1}.
5. Sends problem instance {P, sP,Q, rQ, rxQ, (V0,M
(0)
ξ ),(V1,M
(1)
ξ ),(rVb,M
(b0)
ξ+1 ),
(rVb,M
(b0)
ξ+1 )} to A.
6. A makes a query to H2. For all queries randomly chooses a value form the
keyspace.
7. Returns value b that is output by A.
AˆMFGP generates the instance {P, sP,Q, rQ, rxQ, (V0,M
(0)
ξ ),
(V1,M
(1)
ξ ),(V
′
b0
,M
(b)
ξ+1) (V
′
b¯0
,M
(b¯)
ξ+1)} and AˆMDHP calculates the instance
{P, sP,Q, rQ, rxQ, (V0,M
(0)
ξ ),(V1,M
(1)
ξ ),(rVb,M
(b0)
ξ+1 ), (rVb,M
(b0)
ξ+1 )}.
Note that these instances might not be correct to A, since b may not equal to
b0. If b = b0, A does not stop in tpoly steps, where tpoly is polynomial in λ.
Therefore Aˆ chooses b ∈ {0, 1} randomly.
The success probability of Aˆ is calculated as follows. Assume that
Pco−BDHP1,2 is not negligible. The probability that Aˆco−BDHP1,2 outputs Qi =
e(sP, Vb0)
rx is
Pco−BDHP1,2
2qnum . That is not negligible.
The other case is when Pco−BDHP1,2 is negligible. AˆMFGP and AˆMDHP re-
ceive an input and generate the problem instances to A. The probability that
b = b0 and b = b0 is
1
2 . In case b = b0 the success probability equals to the
success probability of A, denoted by PA. When b = b0, Aˆ chooses b ∈ {0, 1}, let
Pb denote the probability that b is chosen. Hence, the probability that Aˆ outputs
the bit b is (1 − Pco−BDHP1,2)(
1
2PA +
1
2Pb). Assuming PA ≥
1
2 + μ, where μ is
not negligible and Pb =
1
2 we get
(1− Pco−BDHP1,2)(
1
2
PA +
1
2
Pb) ≥ (
1
2
+
μ
2
)− (
1
2
+
μ
2
)Pco−BDHP1,2 ≥
1
2
+ μˆ,
for some μˆ that is not negligible. Therefore the success probability of Aˆ is not
negligible. Since all algorithms are eﬃcient, Aˆ is eﬃcient as well.
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We also prove that if DDH2,2,2 Problem is hard, then the adversary is not
able to link the plaintexts with their senders, even if RA reveals all data from
the database, except the secret key s and R provides all data including the
secret keys. We deﬁne variations of a new problem called Divisible Decisional
Factorized Diﬃe-Hellman Problem(DDF-DHP) as follows.
Deﬁnition 16 The DDF −DHi,j Problem. Given a pairing problem in-
stance Γ = (q,G1, G2, GT , P1, P2, e) and values i, j ∈ {1, 2} we deﬁne the
DDF − DHi,j Problem to be the following: Given aPj , bPj , xPj and cPi, with
a, b, c, x ∈ Z∗q , we are asked to decide whether c ≡ x/ab (mod q).
Lemma17. Given a pairing problem instance Γ = (q,G1, G2, GT , P1, P2, e) if
there is an eﬃcient adversary that breaks DDF −DHi,j Problem, then we can
construct a polynomial time algorithm that breaks the DDHj,j,j Problem, where
values i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. ADDHj,j,j algorithm is constructed as follows. ADDHj,j,j receives in-
put aPj , bPj , cPj , with a, b, c ∈ Z
∗
q , generates and submits input instance
(aPj := aPj , bPj := bPj , xPj := dcPj , cPi := dPi) to ADDF−DHi,j , where d ∈ Z
∗
q
chosen randomly. ADDHj,j,j returns the output (true or false) received from
ADDF−DHi,j . If ADDF−DHi,j is eﬃcient, then ADDHj,j,j is eﬃcient as well.
Theorem18. If there exists a static, eﬃcient adversary in the semi-honest
model that links plaintexts with their senders in BILMIX, there exists a poly-
nomial time algorithm ADDF−DH1,2 that solves DDF −DH1,2 Problem in the
random oracle model.
Proof. RA possesses a list of triplets (Si, H1(msg)+u
(i)P, s(H1(msg)+u
(i)P ))
and R has a list of tuples (msg,H1(msg), sH1(msg), rsH1(msg), rmu
(i)Q). Let
A′ denote the adversary who can link plaintexts with their senders, i.e. decide
whether an element msg from the list of R is generated by Si from the list of
RA. We construct the eﬃcient algorithm ADDF−DH1,2 as follows.
Algorithm ADDF−DH1,2 :
1. Receives (P,Q, aQ, bQ, xQ, cP), where P and Q are generators of G1 and
G2, respectively.
2. Simulate public key inputs for A′: P := P, sP := tP, srP := vP, where
t, v ∈ Z∗q are randomly chosen
Q := Q, sQ := tQ, rQ := aQ, mQ := bQ, xmQ := lbQ, where l ∈ Z∗q is
randomly chosen
3. Simulate a list element of R: msg := bs, H1(msg) := T, sH1(msg) := tT,
rsH1(msg) := M, rmu
(i)Q := xQ, where bs is a random bitsring and T,M ∈ G1
are chosen randomly
4. Simulate a list element of RA: Si := I, H1(msg) + u
(i)P := T + cP,
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s(H1(msg) + u
(i)P ) := t(T + cP), where I is a random bitstring
5. Simulates a list element of ββ: μi := e(tP, xQ) · e(M, bQ), εi := I ⊕H2(μ
l
i)
6. Sends all data to A′.
7. Returns value b ∈ {true, false} that is output by A′.
During simulation ADDF−DH1,2 calls random oracles for calculating hash values.
We get the advantage of static adversary as AdvADDF−DH1,2 = AdvA′ .
5 Conclusions and future work
As far as we know, our proposal (BILMIX) is the ﬁrst hybrid mixnet based
on asymmetric bilinear pairings. We have given an experiment-based security
deﬁnition of sender anonymity and also proved that the mixnet we proposed
provides anonymity against static adversaries in the semi-honest model, as-
suming that the co-Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman Problem, the Matching Find-Guess
Problem and the Matching Diﬃe-Hellman Problem are hard. We also deﬁned
variations of a new problem called Divisible Decisional Factorized Diﬃe-Hellman
Problem (DDF-DHP), we show that ﬁnding connection between data stored by
RA and R is at least as hard as breaking DDF-DHP, with the assumption that
secret keys of RA and ββ are kept secret. The next step is to extend BILMIX
to achieve end-to-end veriﬁability in a malicious model.
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